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Sri Lanka: A Study in Microcosm of
Regional Problems and the Need for More
Effective Protection of Human Rights
PATRICIA HYNDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes events both as a study in microcosm of some
current human rights issues in the Asia Pacific region, and as a vehicle
through which to address the current need for more effective protection
of human rights as one necessary part of a wider strategy for the promo-
tion and enhancement of peace.'
Sri Lanka, like many other countries, has recently experienced a de-
teriorating economy and a consequent serious decline in standards of liv-
ing, a state of affairs exacerbated by the deflection of government expen-
diture to military purposes and away from programs of education,
research, health and welfare. During the last decade, the numbers of inci-
dents of violence occurring in the country with ethnic, religious and polit-
ical overtones have been escalating rapidly. In many of these incidents
police and security forces have at best stood by ineffectively or, at worst,
have themselves participated in attacks on unarmed minority groups, on
peaceful strikers, and on demonstrators. Vigilante groups have sprung up
in different parts of the country. The numbers of extra-judicial execu-
tions, tortures, arbitrary arrests, murders, and disappearances number in
the tens of thousands, and political detainees have been brutally mur-
dered while held in custody in state prisons. Meanwhile, the government
has repeatedly failed to mount impartial investigations to identify and
bring to justice the perpetrators of these breaches of human rights.
In a different arena, government sponsored transmigration schemes
have exacerbated ethnic tensions, particularly in the eastern parts of the
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country. Elsewhere, Sri Lanka's indigenous peoples, the Veddhas, have
been pushed off the lands they traditionally occupied, and discrimination
of different kinds have been practiced against other minority groups.
Added to this there have been incidents calculated to undermine the in-
dependence of the judiciary and of lawyers; human rights lawyers have
been threatened and attacked, some even murdered, as a direct conse-
quence of their involvement in the defence of some particular accused.
Successive and lengthy states of emergency have been declared. In-
creasingly wide powers have been vested in the executive arm of govern-
ment, and this trend has been accompanied by an increasing non-ac-
countability of both the military and police forces. Over the past decade
emergency powers have been used to disadvantage real and assumed po-
litical opponents of the party in power through, inter alia, the proscrip-
tion of opposition parties, the imprisonment of their leaders, or other
measures to silence them and their campaigns in the periods prior to elec-
tions. In addition there has been severe press censorship and extensive
direct and indirect government control over the media generally. Despite
such measures, there have also been serious irregularities in the conduct
of elections, some of which have received later sanction in legislation.
During the last ten years in Sri Lanka there has been a steady escala-
tion of violence, an erosion of democratic principles and of the rule of
law, serious breaches of human rights, the creation of situations of severe
deprivation and an increasing brutalization of society. As in all communi-
ties, the violence and hardship has impacted most severely on those
groups least able to protect themselves -- the elderly, the sick or injured,
and children. One direct consequence has been that Sri Lanka has be-
come a major producer of asylum seekers, thereby adding to the strains
and stresses currently experienced by the international system protecting
refugees.
First, some background information on Sri Lanka is provided to put
the events outlined in this introduction into context. These events are
then examined in more detail. Next, a possible approach is considered
towards the prevention of such escalations of violence, erosions of democ-
racy and derogations of human rights.
In its Preamble, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights states:
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of free-
dom, justice and peace in the world [and that] it is essential , if man
is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be pro-
tected by the rule of law.
In this paper, ways to contribute to that foundation of freedom, jus-
tice and peace are considered. In the second part of the paper, one possi-
ble means of the promotion of "the recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all people," an initiative cur-
rently being taken by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee is ex-
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amined. This initiative has so far led to a Draft Pacific Charter of Rights
and, it is hoped, will lead ultimately to the establishment of a human
rights promotion and protection mechanism for the Pacific, and eventu-
ally prove an impetus for the establishment of such a mechanism for the
Asia Pacific region as a whole.
II. SRI LANKA: A STUDY IN MICROCOSM
A. Background Information on Sri Lanka
1. Demography, Religion, Language and Legal System
According to the 1981 census, the population of Sri Lanka is
predominantly Sinhalese (74%), 18.2% Tamils, and 7% Muslim descend-
ants from Moorish traders.2 The remaining 0.8% includes small minority
groups such as: the tribal peoples (the Veddhas); the Burghers (descend-
ants of colonial-era Ceylonese-European marriages); and the few Europe-
ans who live on the island.
The arrival in the country of the first members of the two largest
ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, is shrouded in myths and
legends. It seems that members of both groups have been in Sri Lanka for
at least two thousand years. Historically, the Sinhalese have considered
the Tamils as invaders upon Sinhalese territory. Both groups originally
arrived from India -- the Sinhalese from northern, and the Tamils from
southern, India. The Tamils who live in Sri Lanka are divided into two
separate groups. The smaller group, the "Indian" Tamil group, forms
5.6% of the total population. They are descendants of people brought
from India to Sri Lanka by the British in the nineteenth century as in-
dentured laborers to work on plantations. These people live mainly in the
hill country in the central part of the island, and most of them still work
on the plantations.
The majority of the Tamils in the country (12.6%) are variously
called the "Ceylon," "Jaffna," or "Sri Lankan" Tamils. This group has
lived in Sri Lanka for hundreds, possibly thousands, of years. Many
"Ceylon" Tamils live in the north and east, areas claimed by Tamil mili-
tants for the separate state they wish to establish. In the early 1980's, in
the northern and eastern districts, Tamils formed 97.7% of the popula-
tion in the district of Jaffna, 89.9% in Mullaitivu, 76.3% in Vavuniya,
72% in Batticoloa, 64.0% in Mannar, and 36.4% in Trincomalee. In addi-
tion, many "Ceylon" Tamils have lived and worked for generations in ar-
eas of the country with a predominantly Sinhalese population.'
The island is home to a variety of religions. The great majority of the
Sinhalese people are Buddhist; a small number are Christian. The Tamil
2. Department of Census Statistics, Ministry of Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka Cen-
sus of Population and Housing (1981).
3. Id.
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population is predominantly Hindu, although some Tamils also are Chris-
tian. A smaller segment of the population, mainly the descendants of
Moorish traders, are Muslims. The percentages in the 1970's were said to
be: Buddhists 66.3%, Hindus 18.5%, Christians 8.4%, and Muslims
6.7%.4
A factor of some significance is that many people in Sri Lanka iden-
tify Buddhism with Sinhalese nationalism and virtually equate being
Sinhalese and being Buddhist. Many Buddhists believe that Sri Lanka
was consecrated by the Buddha. The country is one of the world's major
Buddhist centers. It is claimed that the Buddhism which exists in Sri
Lanka is the closest to the original teachings of Buddha. Buddhism has
been preserved here while, in surrounding countries, other religions have
gained strength. This adds to the feeling that moves towards separatism
not only threaten the Sinhalese race but also threaten Buddhism, a fear
that has tended to dominate government policy, to be exploited by rival
political parties for short-term political gains, to exacerbate tensions and
to result in expressions of intolerance towards other groups and other
religions.
Language is another important factor. The Tamils and the Sinhalese
have languages which are quite different and which have different alpha-
bets. During British rule the medium of education in many schools, espe-
cially those in the cities, was English. As a consequence both Tamils and
Sinhalese could be, and were, educated together. The common language
provided an essential bridge by which friendships transcending ethnic
barriers could be formed.'
After Independence in 1948, moves were made to use the local lan-
guages. The consequence has been that children are taught either in
Sinhala or in Tamil. They learn from different basic texts and are imbued
with different traditions and cultures. They grow up separately, speaking
different languages, writing in different alphabets and identifying with
one of the two races only. Some Sinhalese and some Tamils, but not large
numbers, speak English in addition to their own language, but many
Sinhalese people do not speak Tamil and vice versa. Hence many people
in the country are unable to communicate with each other. This situation
undoubtedly has been instrumental in providing fertile ground for the
growing misunderstandings and misperceptions between the two
communities.
In addition to these complexities in the fabric of the society, the
country's legal system has complexities of its own. Described by one au-
thor as a "legal museum," it contains elements of the laws of the main
ethnic groups overlaid with elements of the systems introduced by succes-
sive colonial powers and, more recently, modern Sri Lankan law, legisla-
tive and judicial. Sri Lanka was colonized first by the Portuguese in the
4. JAMES JUPP, SRI LANKA: THIRD WORLD DEMOCRACY 35 (1978).
5. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 277.
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early sixteenth century and later by the Dutch, who were followed by the
British. The Portuguese left little trace of their legal system, but Roman-
Dutch law has had a strong and continuing influence. The British re-
tained the legal system administered by the Dutch but gradually an over-
lay of English common law and statutes filtered in as well. In addition
unofficial regulation continues in the form of local values and social and
religious practices.
2. The Post-Independence Constitutions and the Protection of Ba-
sic Rights Under the Present Sri Lankan Constitution
At the outset it should be noted that the Tamil community has not
participated in the drafting, nor in the adoption, of any of the post-Inde-
pendence constitutions. Tamils claim that they have, therefore, never re-
linquished sovereignty over their traditional homelands. They assert that
this sovereignty reverted to them when Sri Lanka emerged from colonial
dependence at the time of the granting of independence by Britain in
1948. In essence and without going into detail, the Tamils claim the right
to the international legal principle of self-determination.6
The Soulbury Constitution' provided for the Ceylon Constitution Or-
der-in-Council which had effect from February 4th 1948 and contained no
bill of rights, but in section 29 did provide that:
No... law shall... make persons of any community or religion liable
to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or
religions are not made liable; or ... confer on persons or on any com-
munity or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred
on persons of other communities or religions.
Should any legislation be enacted which was alleged to contravene the
rights guaranteed by the constitution, the matter could be taken to the
courts and ultimately to the Privy Council in London, at that time the
final court of appeal in the Sri Lankan court hierarchy.
Section 29, the safeguards it provided, and appeals to the Privy
Council were abolished when Sri Lanka became a Republic and a new
constitution was enacted by Mrs. Bandaranaike's government in 1972.
This new constitution conferred priority status upon both the language
and the religion of the majority Sinhalese community, declaring Sinhala
to be the country's only "official language" and giving "foremost place"
among religions to Buddhism.
The newest and present Constitution was promulgated by the
Jayawardene government in 1978 very shortly after it came to power in
the 1977 general elections. This Constitution did accord to the Tamil lan-
6. See R. Balasubraminian, Ceylon Tamils and the Revival of Sovereignty, in
HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 372-75.
7. The Order-in-Council of the United Kingdom Parliament under which Sri Lanka
came to independence in 1948, authorized in the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, 11 Geo. 6,
Ch. 37 (Eng.).
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guage the status of being a "national" language,' though Sinhala is still
the only "official" language.' Freedom of religion is guaranteed by Arti-
cles 10 and 14. However, Buddhism remains in the "foremost place"
among religions,' 0 and Article 9 states that "it shall be the duty of the
state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana."
The 1978 Constitution contains a much more comprehensive protec-
tion of rights than did its predecessors. Many, but not all, of the rights
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
are included in Chapter III."' Protected are: freedom of thought, con-
science and religion; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment; the right to equality and freedom from discrimination on the
grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion or place of
birth and the possibility of special protection for the advancement of
women, children or disabled persons is provided for; freedom from arbi-
trary arrest, detention and punishment; prohibition of retro-active penal
legislation; and freedom of speech, assembly, association, occupation and
movement. Article 4(d) states:
The fundamental rights which are by the Constitution declared
and recognized shall be respected, secured and advanced by all the
organs of government, and shall not be abridged, restricted or denied,
save in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided.
Article 15 allows restrictions to be placed on some of these protected
rights in the interests of national security, racial or religious harmony,
national economy or public order, and the protection of public health or
morality. Nevertheless no limitation is permitted on the rights protected
by Article 10, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or by Article
11, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
Article 27 of Chapter VI of the Constitution contains many of the
rights which receive protection under the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. 2 These are included as "directive
principles of state policy and fundamental duties." As is the case with
many similar provisions in other constitutions, for instance some of con-
stitutions of Pacific island states, these provisions are not enforceable.'3
A potentially very valuable provision which was introduced in the
1978 Constitution is Article 126. This provides for the enforcement of the
rights protected under Chapter III, and gives the Supreme Court sole and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions relating to the infringement,
8. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 19 (1978).
9. Id. at art. 18.
10. Id. at art. 9.
11. Id. at arts. 10-17.
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
Art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, adopted by G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6313 (1966).
13. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 29 (1978).
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by executive or administrative action, of any fundamental right, or lan-
guage right, protected by the Constitution. In addition, Article 156 makes
provision for the establishment of an Ombudsman. The duty of this office
is to investigate and report "upon . . . allegations of the infringement of
fundamental rights and other injustices by public officers and officers of
public corporations, local authorities and other like institutions."
The independence of the judiciary receives comprehensive constitu-
tional protection." The Preamble refers to the "immutable republican
principles of representative democracy" and assures to " all peoples free-
dom, equality, justice, fundamental human rights and the independence
of the judiciary as the intangible heritage that guarantees the dignity and
well-being of succeeding generations." Article 107 governs the appoint-
ment and removal of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.
The appointments are made by the President, the judges hold office "dur-
ing good behavior." They may not be removed except by the President
and only then after an address for removal made by Parliament intro-
duced by not less than a third of its members and supported by a major-
ity of the total number of members, including those not present. Under
Article 108, judges' salaries are to be determined by Parliament and may
not be reduced for any judge during that judge's term of office. Article
116 provides that every judge shall exercise and perform his/her powers
and functions without being subject to any direction or other interfer-
ence, and that every person who, without legal authority, interferes or
attempts to interfere with the exercise or performance of the judicial
power or functions of any judge shall be guilty of an offense.
3. Ratification of International Human Rights Instruments
Early in its term of office, the Jayawardene government ratified sev-
eral important international human rights instruments: the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,16 including Article 41 recognizing
the Human Rights Committee as competent to hear inter-state com-
plaints, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 6 the International Convention on the Suppression and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Apartheid," and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.i
s
14. See id. at Ch. XV and arts 107, 108, 116.
15. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, adopted by G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
16. Supra note 12.
17. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, July 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244, adopted by G.A. Res. 3068, U.N.GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30A, U.N. Docs A/9233/Add., and A/L.712/Rev. 1 (1973).
18. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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B. Regional Problems in Microcosm
1. Children
Children by their very nature are vulnerable, unable to protect them-
selves against the superior power of adults, and against socio-economic,
civil and political and other conditions over which they have no control.
Children are always among the first to take the brunt of civil strife, bur-
geoning third world debt and the hardships which follow. Children in Sri
Lanka are no exception. One aspect only of their condition is examined in
this paper, the situation of those children who are forced prematurely
into the labor market by poverty and associated factors.
Frequently young children work for long hours in totally unsatisfac-
tory conditions. They may have no adequate protective clothing, no un-
ions to advance their rights, no severance or unemployment benefits and
no health care. Although domestic protective legislation concerning the
conditions of working children is quite extensive in Sri Lanka'9 as it is in
other nearby countries of South Asia, social and economic realities often
militate against its enforcement. Working children frequently have no
educational or training opportunities to enable them to progress in later
years to more skilled occupations. Childhood is the time when a child's
future is set, yet with little or no access to welfare, health or educational
facilities, or effective legal protection, young child laborers generally exist
in conditions of extreme hardship, and are caught in a vicious cycle of
poverty and oppression from which it is unlikely that they, or their chil-
dren in turn, will ever escape.20 Distressingly, the numbers of children in
the world who must work to survive' are increasing.
As in many developing countries, the population of Sri Lanka is
predominantly rural. Child laborers in the rural sector work on tea plan-
tations, in farming, or in activities ancillary to the fishing industry. When
working out of doors they may go unprotected against burning sun, driv-
ing rain or cold temperatures. Recently small boys between the ages of
eight and fourteen who had been kidnapped from their homes were found
in coastal areas laboring in the scorching sun for long hours each day,
salting and drying fish.
22
In the urban sectors of the countries of South Asia children work at-
all kinds of jobs:2 ' as domestic servants, in factories, as "apprentices" to
19. See S. Goonesekera, Child Labour and Child Prostitution in Sri Lanka and the
Legal Controls, in THE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF THE CHILD, NOVEM-
BER 12-13, 1984: SINGAPORE AND THE CONFERENCE ON CHILD LABOUR AND CHILD PROSTITU-
TION, FEBRUARY 21-23, 1986, KUALA LUMPUR (Patricia Hyndman ed., 1986) [hereinafter
Goonesekera, Child Labor].
20. See Report of Seminar on the Exploitation of Child Laborers (1988).
21. ILO Regional Workshop to Combat Child Labor, Sept. 1986, PIACT/1986/9, at 2.
22. Goonesekera, Child Labor, supra note 19, at 137.
23. Id. at 137.
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various trades, in hotels, restaurants and street trades, in mines, heavy
manufacturing industries, and on construction sites, in jewelry industries,
and with automobile repairs and servicing -- to name just some of their
occupations. Others are "self-employed," performing tasks such as shin-
ing shoes, and scavenging for re-usable waste.
Children are used for purposes which are clearly illegal as well. Their
swiftness and nimbleness encourage adults to employ them to thieve.
Both boys and girls are employed in organized prostitution, pornography
and drug trafficking. Clubs in the developed world advertise sex tours to
third world countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and provide
clients with information regarding the availability of young boys, the risks
involved, how much to pay and how to avoid being arrested. In addition,
children are being recruited, often against their free will and at very
young ages, into national armed forces and into various armed militant
groups.
Children in Sri Lanka suffer from abuses of all these kinds -a far
cry from the protection sought to be conferred on them by more than 80
international instruments, and most recently by the most comprehensive
of the international instruments for the protection of children, the 1989
UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. 4
2. Minority Issues
As may be imagined from the background already provided there is
potential in a country like Sri Lanka for a number of minority issues to
surface. A survey of some of them is briefly outlined in this section.
a. The Minority Syndrome
The first is the "minority syndrome." Several communities within Sri
Lanka are fearful due to their positions as minorities. The Sinhalese
themselves, despite being a 74% majority in the island, number only
twelve million and thus are a very small group in the South Asia region.
Only twenty-two miles away across the Palk Straits are the nearest shores
of the state of Tamil Nadu in Southern India, with its more than fifty
million Tamil inhabitants.
In addition to the Tamils, who are considered in a separate sub-sec-
tion, other communities as well have exhibited signs of anxiety due to
their position as minorities. Christians generally, and Sinhalese Christians
in particular, feel isolated, and are fearful as a minority group. Some
Muslim communities have been subject to violent attacks and recently
are said to have launched counter-attacks on other groups.
The fears of these different groups, whether originally realistic and
legitimate or not, have served to heighten the level of tension in the coun-
24. United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20,
1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
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try, and thus make outbursts more likely. There is a dangerous and
frightening spiral of fears, non-communication, resentments and over-re-
action which more and more is erupting in alarming episodes of violence.
b. The Veddhas
The Veddhas are probably the oldest race in the island.2" Their num-
ber is variously estimated but is very small, 0.01% of the population at
most.26 A difficulty encountered when attempting to estimate their num-
bers is the problem of definition: Who is a Veddha?
The Veddhas are nowhere defined for the purposes of national law.
The approach used for the 1911 Census was that people who "had knowl-
edge of their varuge" (i.e. social group or clan), and a knowledge of Ved-
dha religion combined with hunting as an "occupation" would be counted
as a Veddha. 27 In the Census of 1946, the procedure adopted was that
whoever described himself or herself as a Veddha, if he or she thought fit'
to do so, was counted as such.28 Generally when Veddhas are spoken of
the reference is to a group whose membership is defined by culture, self-
perception and the perception which other groups have about them,
rather than to a group defined by race, or by language (i.e. differences in
the culture and in the structural organization of the Veddha community
distinguish it from other communities in the country).
The Veddhas have their own language, which is unwritten but con-
tinues to be spoken in remote areas. Veddhas who live a traditional life-
style in the jungle do not attend schools and cannot read or write; Tradi-
tionally Veddhas were hunter-gatherers and the forest ecology deter-
mined the structure of their society.29 The restricted scale of resources
available to them and their nomadic lifestyle demanded that the size of
individual groups remain small. Veddha groups, or clans, are generally
composed of either the nuclear or extended family or by a few family
units. Unlike the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the Veddhas do not have a
system of dowry. Instead, simple gifts are given by the prospective son-in-
law to the father of the bride, and he in turn is given a small gift by his
future wife.30 In Veddha society there is no striking difference in the sta-
tus of men and women. Women are not considered inferior. There are
discriminations, however, in property entitlement.
Traditionally, each clan occupied a clearly defined territorial area
spread throughout a jungle region. Boundaries were determined by the
mark of an arrowhead on rocks or trees and these were treated with re-
spect by other Veddhas. The territory of each clan historically was suffi-
25. H.A.I. GOONETILEKE, 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CEYLON 179 (1973).
26. The latest available Census figures in which the Veddhas were separately recorded
are those of 1953. They then numbered 3,000, or 0.01% of the population.
27. 1911 Census, cited in NANDADEVA WIJESEKERA, VEDDHAS IN TRANSITION 192 (1964).
28. Id. at 95.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 95
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cient to supply members of the group with game, roots, plants, flowers
and honey. The Veddhas live in simple dwellings, lean-tos, caves or
hollow trees, as is appropriate to their nomadic life-style. Their tools are
simple. Luxuries, and indeed any possessions, are few. Personal belong-
ings are kept to a minimum, and most property is held in common with
other members of the clan. The Veddhas' religion, like that of many other
primitive peoples, is animistic. 1
Today, little of the territory in which Veddhas traditionally lived re-
mains in its natural state, and full expression of traditional Veddha cul-
ture found among the jungle dwelling tribes is fast disappearing. Cultural
assimilation of the Veddhas with other societies has been going on for
many hundreds of years. In addition, over the last several decades the
Veddha hunting grounds have been greatly diminished. Since the early
nineteenth century, lands have been cleared and transformed into planta-
tions. In the twentieth century, irrigation schemes have rendered for-
merly unproductive lands capable of supporting farming, and successive
waves of agricultural settlement have reduced the areas of wilderness
available to support nomadic tribes. Private entrepreneurs have, legally
and illegally, felled forest timber, and the modern hunting practices of
other Sri Lankans have seriously depleted the wildlife in the jungles.
Generally, the Veddhas have quietly submitted to encroachment by
other groups, or, if they have resisted, they have done so passively and
ultimately have retreated. As the land available to them has been reduced
they have begun to practice shifting cultivation, but they are not natu-
rally agriculturalists and would much prefer to hunt. The Veddha view of
the jungle surrounding their dwelling areas is one of communal property
which belongs to the clan members.
Under Sri Lankan law there is no recognition of Veddha rights to
their ancient lands. No treaties have been made with them, and they
come under no special legal provisions. Despite the legal pluralism of
some parts of the Sri Lankan legal system there is no institutionalized
place for Veddha traditional laws, and Veddha views of the jungle land
surrounding their villages as being held in communal ownership conflict
with the government view of these areas as Crown land. According to
Brown, an anthropologist writing in 1978: "Even in recent historic times
the Veddhas are known to have been still widely distributed throughout
the island." 2 An article in the Lanka Guardian in 1983 warned that the
"perpetuation of the Veddha institutional structure is clearly linked to a
particular forest ecology" and that "disturbance of this delicate relation-
ship" will lead to a destabilization of the structural basis of this commu-
nity and thereafter their existence as "an individual techno-cultural
group."33 In 1982, an academic member of Peradeniya University pre-
31. S. Senevirantne, The Curse of the Duveni, LANKA GUARDIAN, May 1983, at 10.
32. JAMES BROWN, VEDDHA VILLAGES IN ANURADHAPURA 31 (1978).
33. Seneviratne, supra note 31, at 9.
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dicted that in fifteen or twenty years time the Veddhas would be ex-
tinct.34 This prediction seems, sadly, to be increasingly probable as warn-
ings are not being heeded and the plight of the Veddha people is afforded
scant attention. 5
c. The Status of Tamils "Of Recent Indian Origin"
Both Sinhalese and Tamil groups perceive each other as having re-
ceived unfair privileges and advantages. Some of these perceptions are
due more to misunderstandings and myths that to actual facts. Some
have real foundation.
One sector of Sri Lankan society with very real cause for feeling ag-
grieved is the group known as "Indian" Tamils brought to Sri Lanka from
southern India by the British in the nineteenth century to work in the
plantations. Since that -time these people have worked for long hours for
very low pay, and they have contributed enormously to the country's
economy. Yet, although born in Sri Lanka and, in many cases, descended
from one, two or more generations of ancestors also born in the country, a
hundred years after their initial arrival large numbers of "Indian" Tamils
were without Sri Lankan citizenship and in effect stateless persons.
Prior to Independence, they, in common with all others born in ei-
ther India or Sri Lanka, were British subjects and entitled to vote. In
fact, in the general elections of 1947 they elected seven Indian Tamil
Members of Parliament s' and exercised a significant influence on the vot-
ing in several other electorates as well. No provisions concerning citizen-
ship were contained in the 1948 Constitution. For the "Indian" Tamils
this omission carried grave consequences.
One of the first acts of the new government was to determine the
country's citizenship requirements. Legislation was enacted conferring
citizenship only on those people who had either been born in Sri Lanka to
fathers also born there or, if those seeking citizenship had not been born
in the island, their fathers and grandfathers were required to have been
born there. Due to the lack of records such facts were very difficult to
prove. Not everyone was required to furnish the proof in order to acquire
citizenship, but Indian Tails were required to provide this evidence, and
generally could not do so. By a later statute, citizenship was made availa-
ble by registration in certain circumstances, but for a variety of reasons
few Indian Tamils took advantage of this provision.
The outcome was that most Indian Tamils were rendered effectively
stateless and were disenfranchised as well. A group without voting power
is likely to experience considerable difficulty in securing equal treatment
for itself, and this has been the case for the Indian Tamils. Education and
34. Professor K.N.O. Dharmadasa, COLUMBO DAILY NEWS, June 4, 1982.
35. V. Stegborn, Sri Lanka: The Veddhas - A People Under Threat, 42 IWGIA NEWS-
LETT'ER 166 (1985).
36. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, Appendix XXIII, at 166.
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medical facilities in the areas where Indian Tamils reside have been con-
sistently of a lower than general standard, and social welfare benefits and
the granting of cost of living adjustments have lagged seriously behind
those enjoyed by other sectors of the community."1 Although over the
years various arrangements have been made to grant citizenship to Indian
Tamils - citizenship either of India or of Sri Lanka - by the mid-1980's
considerable numbers of these people, despite Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration ("Everyone has the right to a nationality"), continued to be
both stateless and exceedingly underprivileged.3
d. The "Ceylon" Tamils
i. Education and State Sector Employment
During colonial times Tamils held what was later perceived to be a
disproportionately large number of university places, high governmental
positions, domination of the professions. This happened partly because
particularly good missionary schools had been established in Tamil areas,
and partly due to other factors which have long motivated Tamils in Sri
Lanka to view education, and work in the professions and public sector,
as the means to economic progress.
After Independence successive governments took measures to redress
the imbalance between Sinhalese and Tamils in educational achievement
and public sector employment.3 9 These measures included the provision
of better schools in Sinhala districts and "standardization" and then
"quota" systems of admissions to universities and a favoring, by govern-
ment policy, of Sinhalese as against Tamils in new recruitment to state
employment. The consequence was a greatly reduced proportion of uni-
versity places and public sector jobs gained by Tamils. International
human rights norms and Article 12(2) of the Sri Lankan Constitution for-
bid discrimination between people "on the grounds of race, religion, lan-
guage, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one of such
grounds," except when separate treatment is justified as a measure essen-
tial to empower disadvantaged groups. When this is the case, empowering
positive discrimination is permitted, but only temporarily, until the for-
merly disadvantaged groups have reached a position of real equality.
By the early 1980's, statistics compiled by the Marga Institute, a re-
search organization based in Colombo'4 0 were released by the University
Grants Commission 4 and by government sources, showing any previous
37. Sie, e.g. HYNDMAN, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 260 (statement adopted
by the National Council of the Ceylon Workers Congress, August 14, 1983).
38. See HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 9-13.
39. See HYNDMAN, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 272-276.
40. FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 17, 1983, at 31.
41. Statistics on University admissions released by Division of Planning and Research,
University Grant Commission, 1983, reprinted in LANKA GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1983, at 10. Sta-
tistics on public sector employment released by the Dept. of Census and Statistics and Min-
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imbalance to have been corrected. However, the quota system and em-
ployment selection systems were not withdrawn. To Tamils, with their
emphasis on educational achievement, accessibility on a criterion of merit
to university entrance and to pubic sector employment is extremely im-
portant, and these policies have been the source of very real grievances.
ii. The Status of the Tamil Language
The status of the Tamil language within Sri Lanka has been another
source of discontent. In 1956, eight years after Independence, Mr.
Bandaranaike's government enacted the Official Language Act."2 This leg-
islation provided that Sri Lanka's only "official" language would be
Sinhala"3 and reversed the resolution, adopted in 1944 by the State Coun-
cil, that both Sinhalese and Tamil would be the country's official lan-
guages. Henceforth, the official administration of the country was to be
conducted in Sinhalese, and proficiency in Sinhalese became a require-
ment for confirmation of, appointment to, and promotion within the pub-
lic service. This requirement contributes to Tamil difficulties both in
gaining public sector employment and later in securing promotion, since
Sinhalese for Tamils, and Tamil for Sinhalese is very much a second or
third language.
In 1958 the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act was passed.
This legislation would have ameliorated the situation somewhat, provid-
ing as it did for the use of Tamil in the spheres of education, public ex-
aminations and official correspondence conducted with Tamil speaking
people. Unfortunately, the regulations required for its implementation
were not brought into effect until 1968. They were carried through at that
time amidst strong protests from the opposition parties, by Mr. Dudley
Senanayake, the then Prime Minister, in pursuance of the Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Agreement made between the government and Tamil
leaders in 1965. In 1961, Mrs. Bandaranaike's government passed the
Language of the Courts Act, which provided for the replacement of En-
glish by Sinhala in certain courts of law. In 1972, under this same govern-
ment, the position of Sinhala as the country's only "official" language was
given constitutional status. The Tamil people have interpreted the lan-
guage policies of the different post-Independence Sinhala dominated gov-
ernments as an indication that they were being accorded inferior status.
The Jayawardene government, recognizing that past language poli-
cies were a source of grievance to the Tamil people" sought, by provisions
which it included in its 1978 Constitution, to grant a greater measure of
recognition to the Tamil language. Although Sinhala remained the "offi-
istry of Plan implementation Committee for Rational Development, Sri Lanka's Ethnic
Problems: Myths and Realities, LANKA GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1983.
42. Act No. 33 (1956).
43. Id. at § 2.
44. See UNP Election Manifesto, Colombo, 1977, and its statements and undertakings
concerning The Problems of the Tamil Speaking People.
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cial" language and "the language of administration throughout Sri
Lanka," both Tamil and Sinhala were declared to be "national" lan-
guages.4 5 The new Constitution provided that both languages may be
used in Parliament, though English is also used in Parliament and Han-
sard is published in all three languages, and that official documents and
laws must be published in both Sinhala and Tamil."6 Under the Constitu-
tion, candidates at any official examination are entitled to be examined,
and students are entitled to education, in either of the two official lan-
guages. The Tamil language is required to be used in addition to Sinhala
as the language of administration and in the courts4 of the northern and
eastern regions,46 and any person is entitled to "receive communications
from, and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his
official capacity, in either of the national languages.
'49
The protection thus accorded to the Tamil language by the 1978
Constitution was a very fair recognition of the rights of an 18% majority.
Unfortunately, the failure has been in its implementation. The constitu-
tional recognition was not resized in practice and Sinhala continued to be
used as the language of communication by government departments even
when entirely inappropriate, for instance in replies to letters written in
Tamil by Tamil people.
iii. "Colonization"
Another major factor which has caused severe problems and resent-
ments is the policy, carried out by successive governments over a long
period of time, of land redistribution, or "colonization" as it is called in
Sri Lanka. This process began when the British brought Tamils from In-
dia to work on the plantations in the nineteenth century and placed them
on land taken from Sinhalese people in the hill country to the great re-
sentment of those displaced. More recently, from the 1930's onwards, suc-
cessive governments have adopted a .policy of settlement of the north,
central and eastern regions of the island. This has been done as formerly
dry and unproductive areas have been rendered fertile by irrigation
schemes and has consisted mainly in the resettling of Sinhalese people
from the more densely populated southern areas.
From the outset the Tamil people have objected that this program
affected land within the regions they have regarded as their traditional
homelands. They regard the relocation of large numbers of Sinhalese into
the areas where Tamils have historically formed a high proportion of the
population as a deliberate plan to bring about a change in the ethnic
composition of those areas. The resettlement program has inevitably re-
45. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 19 (1978).
46. Id. at arts. 22-23.
47. Direction made under SRI LANKA CONST. art. 24(1)(a) (1978), on Sept. 7, 1978, re-
printed in GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY, No. 1/6.
48. Id. at art. 22(1).
49. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 22(2) (1978).
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duced the effectiveness of Tamil voting power in these parts of the
country.
Some Sinhalese, on the other hand, see these Tamil protests as fur-
ther evidence of what they view as the inflated demands which this group
continually makes, perceiving the underlying motivation as being the de-
sire of a minority group to secure for itself large tracts of hitherto
sparsely occupied land.
The government approach is that Sri Lanka is home to all Sri
Lankans, that all citizens should be free to live in any part of the island,
and that the colonization programs give due recognition to the rights of
everyone. The argument here is that under the programs, the people are
resettled in numbers proportionate to the ethnic composition of the en-
tire island.5"
Colonization has been a source of agitation for many years and pro-
posed resolutions have included more than one agreement reached be-
tween government and Tamil leaders. The first such agreement was made
in 1957.51 This, and a later agreement made in 196552 were both aban-
doned unilaterally by the different governments which had made them in
response to pressures mounted against their implementation by the oppo-
sition parties of the time.5 3
e. Tamil Moves Towards Violent Opposition
The approach adopted by Tamils to secure what they regard as their
due measure of recognition within the country was, for the first thirty
years after Independence, a peaceful one. They sought a federal arrange-
ment within one country, not a separate state, and did not resort to, nor
advocate, violence as a means of achieving this. In the mid-1970's how-
ever, disillusioned and feeling that they were steadily losing ground, the
Tamil political parties reformed themselves as one party, the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF). One of the planks in TULF's election
platform was separatism, although with the stated aim of achieving this
through negotiation and not by force.
On this platform, TULF gained all the seats in the northern part of
the country, some of those in the eastern region, and became the major
opposition party at the 1977 general election. At about the same time, a
small group of Tamil youth declared their intention to establish a sepa-
rate state and began to resort to violence. Until this time the conduct of
most Tamil people in Sri Lanka had indicated that they opposed an ap-
proach of force.
50. During my visits to Sri Lanka I have been unable to locate any statistics from
which it is possible to verify the actual numbers and ethnic proportions of those who have
been resettled under the schemes.
51. Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
52. Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact.
53. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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f. Government Responses to Growing Tamil Militancy
In order to check the rise of Tamil militancy, the demand for a sepa-
rate state, and other forms of opposition, the Jayawardene government
took a number of measures seriously curtailing rights in circumstances
where these curtailments were not "strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation," and hence were not legitimate under Article 4 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
54
In response to criticisms, the government repeatedly argued that the
steps were essential and that the country was in a state of emergency.
Ironically, the exacerbation of the situation to this degree may have been
brought about in no small measure by restrictions which were excessive
from the outset. Indeed, even given a justifiable state of emergency, some
of the provisions taken were so extreme as to be in contravention of ap-
plicable international human rights norms.
The history of the relevant legislative measures is as follows. In 1979
harsh preventive detention legislation was enacted,55 first as a temporary
measure but made permanent in 1982.56 This prevention of terrorism leg-
islation, although general in its wording, until the late 1980's was directed
almost exclusively at young Tamil males. Indeed in many villages all the
young Tamil males were rounded up and arrested simply because their
age and ethnic origin were deemed by the security forces to make it likely
that they may, at some time, engage in militant activities.57
Successive states of emergency were declared in the early 1980's and,
from May 1983 until after President Jayawardene stepped down and
President Premadasa came to power in 1989, a continuous state of emer-
gency was maintained covering the whole island. Laws promulgated under
this emergency regime,5 8 together with the prevention of terrorism legisla-
tion, have permitted, inter alia: strict censorship of the media,59 silencing
of political opposition,60 prolonged detention without charge or trial, arbi-
trary arrests and imprisonment, and the holding of detainees incommuni-
cado, in army camps and police cells."1 Many detainees have been tor-
tured, some murdered, many others have "disappeared." Inquests into
the deaths of those who have died in state custody have been suspended
except when deemed permissible by security personnel.6 2 The prevention
54. Supra note 15.
55. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 (1979).
56. Act No. 10 (1982).
57. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 43-45.
58. The emergency regulations were brought into existence by proclamation as required
by art. 155(3) of the Constitution, and renewed as required by resolutions passed by a 1/3
majority of parliament under art. 155(8). The authority for the enactment of the emergency
regulations is the Public Security Ordinance, sec. 5.
59. Reg. 14.
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of terrorism legislation and emergency regulations, although initially used
primarily against Tamils, have since been used also in the south against
insurgent Sinhalese groups.
Other emergency regulations imposed on Tamil-dominated areas in
the north and east of the island are so stringent that, where implemented,
they have caused massive disruption to the normal civilian life of the ar-
eas affected. Essential services have ground to a halt, hospitals could not
function adequately, factories were closed, farming could not be carried
out, transportation could not function, schooling was disrupted, and
banks and post offices did not operate. There were grave shortages of
food, fuel, medical and other supplies. The result: deprivation, hardship
and suffering and, from time to time, an exodus of great numbers of
Tamils fleeing to southern India and elsewhere.
The emergency regulations and the prevention of terrorism legisla-
tion, and their mode of implementation, have over the years led to an
increasing feeling amongst the Tamil people that the government identi-
fies the entire Tamil population of the north and east, and not just the
militant elements, as its enemy. The consequence has been increasing fear
and resentment amongst the people in these areas and, despite increasing
violence by Tamil militants, a growing feeling in the minds of more and
more hitherto peaceful Tamil people that their only hopes of salvation lie
with the militants.
g. Erosions of Democracy and the Rule of Law
i. Erosions of Democracy
The 1978 Constitution established a system conferring very wide ex-
ecutive powers on the President.6 3 At the 1977 general elections, the
United National Party (UNP) government gained a landslide victory,
winning 140 of the 168 seats in Parliament. Landslide victories are not
uncommon in Sri Lankan elections. Until 1977, since which date the UNP
has retained its hold on power, it and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP), alternated in office at each election with tremendous swings in
the numbers of votes received on each occasion.
Under the 1978 Constitution, elections were due in 1983 but were not
held. Instead, in 1982 the government used its large majority to amend
the Constitution 4 in order to allow the Parliament to remain in power for
a further six years without a general election but on the result of a refer-
endum. By this means the government, by a vote of 54.6%, retained its
huge parliamentary majority. 5 In the meantime, the President held in his
63. See SM LANKA CONST. arts. 30, 35, 43-44, 46-47, 52, 54 (1978).
64. Id. at amend. IV.
65. In August 1982, the Third Amendment to the Constitution was passed. This in-
serted a new provision, Article 31(3A), empowering the incumbent President to go to the
people after only four years of his six year term in office, and to hold an election at that
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possession signed, undated letters of resignation of all the Members of
Parliament of his party.
The referendum to extend the life of the Parliament was held under
strictures which severely hampered the opposition campaign. Some oppo-
sition politicians were detained under emergency regulations. Some have
been stripped of their civic rights. Some opposition papers were banned
and some opposition presses were sealed. The polling itself was marred by
the harassment of electoral officers, candidates and voters.6
ii. Changes in Electoral Laws
The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order-in-Council of 1946 was
amended in 1984 7 in a manner which gave rise to several concerns. For
instance: henceforth, a result may be declared even if ballot boxes are
missing. Further, an "information," which need not be in writing, stating
it is not possible to commence or continue a poll due to "the occurrence
of events of such a nature," described as a "disturbance" in the marginal
note, is conclusive of the existence of those events.es Once an information
has been made, counting can commence without the receipt of the ballot
boxes from the polling station at which a "disturbance" has been re-
ported, and the result can be declared without these votes being
counted. 9
The effect is to disenfranchise those voters whose votes are in the
ballot boxes which do not reach the counting station, and also to disen-
franchise those who cannot vote due to the occurrence of "events of such
a nature." In effect the legislation concedes election irregularities to be a
feature of Sri Lankan life, yet until the time of the Jaffna Council elec-
tions in 1981, at which blatant irregularities occurred, elections in Sri
Lanka had always been conducted openly and honestly. The procedure
this legislation establishes for the counting of votes and the declaration of
winning candidates in circumstances where "disturbances" have occurred
allows a severe erosion of principles whose maintenance is essential if a
truly democratic system is to survive.
iii. Threats to the Independence of the Judiciary
The independence of the judiciary is well provided for under the
1978 Constitution. Despite this, the independence of judges has been
threatened more than once in recent years. Constitutional guarantees de-
pend for their effectiveness on a determination by those with substantial
time seeking a mandate for a further term. The President did this and in an election boy-
cotted by many Tamils, he received 52.9% of the total number of votes polled.
66. See Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Was the Referendum Free and
Fair?* (1983).
67. Act No. 36 (1984).
68. Id. at § 47A.
69. Id. at § 48.
70. E.g., SM LANKA CONST. arts. 107-08, 116 (1978).
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power under the Constitution that the guarantees be given force.
The transitional provisions of the 1978 Constitution state: "[AIll
judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts . . .holding office on
the day immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall,
on the commencement of the Constitution, cease to hold office." 71 This
gave the Jaywardene government the opportunity, which it took, to effec-
tively remove a number of judges from the former court by not re-ap-
pointing them and, instead, to appoint others to positions on the newly
established Supreme Court. Many lawyers in Sri Lanka saw the changes
thus made to have been politically motivated. By taking this action the
government was able to avoid the effect of the constitutional safeguards
to secure the tenure of the judiciary.
In two cases in the early 1980's,"2 members of the police force were
promoted after being found by the Supreme Court to have acted unlaw-
fully. In each case the Supreme Court had heard complaints brought
against the police officers concerned under Article 126, which gives the
Supreme Court sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions re-
lating to the infringement, by executive or administrative action, of any
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. The Court had, in both
cases, found that the rights of the complainant had been infringed. The
promotions were reported to be made to ensure that public officials
should "follow orders without fear of consequence from adverse court
decisions.
7 3
Two days after the handing down of the judgment for the second
case the houses of the three Supreme Court judges concerned were sur-
rounded by rowdy mobs shouting obscenities, creating disturbances, and
carrying placards referring to the judgment. No one was hurt, but all at-
tempts by the judges to obtain the assistance of the police proved futile.
An editorial in The Island, on the 13th June, 1983, stated:
There is proof that the demonstrators had been brought in buses.
The authorities must initiate an immediate enquiry to ascertain who
was responsible for this demonstration and why the police failed to
respond ... If the judges of the Supreme Court cannot receive imme-
diate protection from the vulgar mobs what chance will the ordinary
citizen stand?
No such enquiries were held and no action was taken. Such a situa-
71. Id. at art. 163.
72. In the first case the Rev. Dharamitipola Ratanasata, Secretary to Pavidi Handa,
brought an action claiming infringement of the right to freedom of expression under Art.
126 after the Superintendent of Police had seized 20,000 of the organizations's leaflets in
which opposition was expressed to the 1983 referendum to extend the life of Parliament.
The second case arose out of an incident during an International Women's Day demonstra-
tion in March 1983 when Mrs. Vivienne Goonewardene, a former MP, complained she was
assaulted while in a police station inquiring about a photographer apprehended during the
demonstration.
73. Civil Rights Movement Publication, Ref CRM E 2/6/83 Colombo, 1983.
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tion neither protects the independence of the judiciary nor serves to rein-
force, in the minds of the citizens of the country, a belief that the rule of
law will be respected and observed.
Twice shortly thereafter allegations of impropriety in the behavior of
judges of the Supreme Court were made, and were considered by Select
Committees of Parliament set up for the purpose. At the time many peo-
ple expressed concern that, taking into account the background in both
cases, i.e. judgments delivered of which the executive disapproved, and
statements made that were critical of the executive, the bringing of the
two judges in question before a Select Committee of Parliament was in-
tended to clearly indicate to them that they are subordinate to, and not
independent of, the executive and the legislature. Democracy cannot sur-
vive long without an independent judiciary. In Blackstone's words:
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a
peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleas-
ure, by the crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty;
which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administration of
common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative
and also from the executive power."4
h. Other Incidents Which Have Tended to Encourage
Lawlessness
In recent years other incidents also have tended to encourage lawless-
ness and to reduce the confidence of ordinary citizens in the power, or
willingness, of the legitimate forces of government to protect them." At-
tacks by organized mobs occur not infrequently, and result in murders,
rape, destruction of property and looting. There has been strong evidence
of complicity by the security forces in some of these attacks. Nonetheless
the government has repeatedly failed to instigate independent, public and
impartial inquiries to identify, and bring to account, those responsible.
Indemnity legislation has been passed on at least two occasions to restrict
legal proceedings against Ministers, Deputy Ministers or any person hold-
ing office in the government.7 6 Such legislation inevitably gives rise to the
impression that the government has condoned any breaches of the law
which may have been committed by these people.
Acts of violence are an increasingly common occurrence. Vigilante
groups flourish. Human Rights activists are threatened, tortured and
killed. The numbers of lawyers willing to take cases involving human
rights issues decreased dramatically in 1989 and 1990 as the killings in-
creased. Since the perpetrators and organizers of these atrocities are not
74. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 269 (T. Tegg, 1830).
75. See generally SOME SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS TENDING TO ENCOURAGE
LAWLESSNESS: CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SRI LANKA, COLOMBO, reproduced as Appendix
XI, HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 361-3.
76. See, e.g., Indemnity Act, Act No. 20, 1982.
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apprehended and brought before the courts, lawlessness and intimidating
behavior carried out by a variety of different groups have become more
and more prevalent. A climate of impunity has been allowed to develop.
As mentioned earlier, the repressive measures and the violence ini-
tially used against Tamils in the northern and eastern parts of the coun-
try has, more recently, been used also in southern Sri Lanka against mili-
tant Sinhalese, those suspected of being militant, and their families.
Sinhalese as well as Tamils were fearful of arbitrary arrest, detention and
torture, and many of them left the country in search of asylum elsewhere.
Sixty thousand deaths are said to be attributable to the excesses of the
security forces in the wake of the recent failed insurrection in the south
by the rural Sinhalese Marxist J.V.P. movement." As in countries of
South America, mothers here have organized marches to bring attention
to the increasing numbers of people taken into detention who simply
"disappear."
The violence developed to involve factions of Sinhalese against each
other and against the government, as well as security forces against them
and against the Tamils in the north. Rival Tamil militant groups carry
out vendettas against each other. Corpses have been found at the sides of
roads encircled by tires filled with petrol and ignited, or bodies are found
hanged from lamp posts, or with heads severed. In fact violence seems to
have become a way of life in Sri Lanka, the instant solution to all
problems, though more recently, the situation in the south has become
much calmer.
i. The Present Position
The tragedy of the catalogue of events just recited is all the more
disturbing when viewed against the context in which it has occurred. Un-
til the early 1980's, Sri Lanka was widely regarded as a country with an
excellent reputation for upholding democratic principles, in which human
rights were respected and where the rule of law prevailed. Moreover, the
present situation of erosion of democratic values, weakening of the au-
thority of the rule of law, perpetration of violence, and provocation of
racial antagonism has occurred against the background of a country with
considerable assets.
Statistics from the early 1980s show the population to be highly liter-
ate, with an 85% literacy rate among adults, life expectancy of 69 years,
and a low infant mortality rate of 37.7 per thousand. While the per capita
income of the country has never been high, Sri Lanka possesses the essen-
tial resources to be successful. The island is not overpopulated, enjoys a
good climate, and possesses large areas of forests, fertile lands, abundant
farming and fishing and productive, plantations. Physically, Sri Lanka is
remarkably beautiful. It has a long-established civilization, many histori-
cal monuments of great interest and antiquity, a rich and varied culture
77. British Refugee Council, SRI LANKA MONITOR, March 1991, at 4.
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and, the present problems notwithstanding, a charming, friendly and
overwhelmingly hospital people.
Yet escalating violence of the kind described above has occurred and
must, eventually, reach the stage where it causes total collapse of normal
civilized society. In parts of Sri Lanka it would seem, sadly, that this is
precisely what has now come about.
I do not know when you will get this letter - if at all. But I am
sending it through some priests who are going abroad - to Colombo,
Sri Lanka!!! you may laugh - but the sad reality is such.
The North and East is completely cut off from the rest of the
island and the world. No telecommunication, no postal service, no
transport, no electricity -no everything. No food is allowed to be
brought in except through the Red Cross who managed to bring in
just a few tons of food. Food items are gone up in price by six or seven
times. Petrol, diesel and kerosene by twelve times as these are
brought in illicitly on bicycles from 115 miles away. There are more
than five hundred thousand refugees in the North and East by gov-
ernment estimates. A good number are in camps but the majority are
with friends, relatives, and good Samaritans.
Here, one of the tragic experiences one faces daily is the bombing
of civilian targets night and day. Every night, every day. Our Bishop's
house bombed, our Cathedral bombed, hospitals bombed, power sta-
tion bombed, thousands of houses demolished in Jaffna, Kilinochchi,
Vavunya, Trincomalee, Manar, Batticaloa. Killing civilians, where the
Sri Lankan army is in control, is a routine affair - with the help of
the so called Home Guards. More than 75,000 refugees as at yesterday
have gone to India. Often one hears of many dead bodies being
washed ashore, shot by the Sri Lankan Navy, or by overloading.
I cover a broad range from one end of my parish to the other,
with many churches, and some small islands. Though the parish had a
vehicle and a boat, now due to scarcity of fuel much of my travelling
for services - both religious and humanitarian - is on the bike. (To
the islands of course by sail boat). There is a co-Pastor who helps me.
At the moment, much of my time is spent on looking after the welfare
of the refugees. Every church is being organized to cater to the refu-
gees. Many weary refugees trek through my parish to find boats to
India. Their stories are just tragic. I have no space or time to write
them to you just now. May be one day .... 78
j. Sri Lanka: A Producer of Asylum Seekers
One consequence of these events has been that Sri Lanka has become
a major producer of asylum seekers. As recounted in the letter, thousands
of people are displaced within the country in search of sanctuary from
78. Extract of a letter written from Northern Sri Lanka August 1990.
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violence, thousands from the north are trying to get to India, many others
are reaching countries further afield by plane and applying for refugee
status there. At the same time international refugee protection is exper-
iencing a period of severe strain.
As summarized in December 1990:
[T]he number of refugees has almost doubled in the last ten years
... the resources available to UNHCR [the Office with the UN man-
date for the protection of refugees] have hardly increased at all. The
basic needs of many uprooted people are not being met. Many of the
world's poorer countries, where the largest concentrations of refugees
are to be found, are struggling to cope with the pressure that the new
arrivals have placed on scarce resources. In the Third World there is
now a discernible tendency to make asylum and protection condi-
tional upon adequate levels of assistance. In the industrialized states,
both politicians and the public have reacted negatively to the growing
number of people seeking sanctuary in their territory. The principles
of refugee protection, painstakingly developed over the course of the
last 40 years, are increasingly being challenged .... 79
The situation in Sri Lanka and the exodus from the country is adding to
the crisis.
Government acceptance of obligations towards refugees is made in a
compromise between the state's absolute power to decide who may enter
and remain in the country, and the recognition of a wider requirement to
assume, and honor, commitments to people recognized by the interna-
tional community to be deserving of international protection. The defini-
tion of such people - "refugees - is a restrictive one. Only those with a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion satisfy its
criteria under international law.80
Developed states which earlier might have more generously offered
places of resettlement for refugees already in camps in countries of first-
asylum, or which might more generously have accommodated those arriv-
ing at their borders and seeking to remain there, are today experiencing
something described as "compassion fatigue."
The 1970's and the 1980's have seen the advent of first "boat" and
now of "jet" refugees. No longer do asylum-seekers merely cross neigh-
boring borders. Modern forms of travel, particularly air travel, has pro-
duced the phenomenon of large numbers arriving at the borders of coun-
tries geographically far removed from their country of origin, countries
with which there are often no historical, linguistic or cultural ties. With a
worsening economic recession, and increasing numbers arriving in this
manner, these distant states are becoming increasingly reluctant to enter-
79. UNHCR, 1990: THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK, REFUGEES, Dec. 1990, at 3.
80. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1A(2), 19 U.S.T. 6260; T.I.A.S.
6577; 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951).
VOL. 20:2
MICROCOSM OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS
tain claims for asylum from people for whom they feel no special respon-
sibility. The situation is exacerbated as governments view large numbers
of these people not as "genuine refugees" but as people in search of a
higher standard of living, or "economic refugees." In addition they are
frequently seen as attempting to by-pass normal immigration procedures
and to "queue-jump" to achieve their ends. Governments express concern
for refugees already in camps whose chances of receiving resettlement of-
fers from third countries may diminish if great numbers of people arrive
to claim refugee status directly from resettlement states; such arrivals
may exhaust the number of places which any given government is pre-
pared to offer for refugee resettlement.
The consequence? An unsympathetic response to all asylum-seekers.
Sometimes no access is provided to refugee status determination proce-
dures, sometimes the procedures which do exist are not fair procedures,
sometimes the 1951 Refugee Convention definition criteria receive an ex-
cessively strict interpretation, sometimes there are forcible repatriations
to the country of origin. In other instances people are rejected at the
frontier on the basis that another state has a more direct and immediate
responsibility. The rejecting state does not always ascertain that this
third state will in fact honor this responsibility."
In the result there is the danger that genuine refugees may be re-
turned, directly or indirectly, to the territory from which they have fled.
Such return, if the people in question are refugees according to interna-
tional law, is contrary to the obligations imposed by the 1951 UN Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol82 and,
relevant to states which are not signatories to these international instru-
ments, may also be contrary to customary international law.
Asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka who apply for refugee status in dis-
tant states are both contributing to the factors which are bringing refugee
protection under strain and, in some cases, are themselves falling victim
to those strains.
C. Concluding Comments on Part II
The current situation of violence and ethnic tensions within Sri
Lanka is one which perhaps wise statesmanship could have avoided. Un-
fortunately, as is so often the case, the steps taken were frequently steps
to secure short-term political advantage while the rights of many of the
people of Sri Lanka, or of particular groups of them, were ignored. Suc-
ceeding governments, political parties in opposition and other powerful
factions, militant groups included: all have contributed to this state of
affairs.
81. See, e.g., J. Crawford and Patricia Hyndman, Three Heresies in the Application of
the Refugee Convention, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 155 (1989).
82. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No.
6577.
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Once violence erupts, the taking of violent measures to control its
perpetrators is a comprehensible, instinctive response, but a circular pat-
tern is thereby set in motion, and violence begets violence. This is pre-
cisely the type of instinctive "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" response
that civilized society and the establishment of legal systems has sought to
transcend and relegate to the level of an historical anachronism. Long-
term solutions will be achieved only through negotiation and removal of
the grievances which underlie militant movements. There is ample evi-
dence, both in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, that strong legislative, adminis-
trative and military measures by governments in attempts to deal with
movements expressive of dissatisfaction do not work and the victory, at
any level of society, achieved as a result of coercion merely sets the stage
for later retaliation.
III. THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
What then can be done? Protection of basic rights, of the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, and of access to a fair and democratic system is
provided under the Sri Lankan Constitution yet this protection has not
proved effective. The reality is that national guarantees of fundamental
rights, however impressive their appearance, will only be as effective as
those wielding real power allow them to be. When use (and abuse) is
made of declarations of states of emergency in circumstances not strictly
in conformity with the requirements of international human rights law,
when opportunity is taken in these periods to increase the power in the
hands of the executive body and/or military forces, when minority groups
are not afforded protection and respect, when the independence of the
judiciary is not jealously maintained, and easy and effective access to
both the legal system and the democratic processes are not assured, pro-
visions protecting the rights of individuals, whether in ordinary legisla-
tion, the common law or enshrined in the constitutional document, sim-
ply will not work.
Such provisions may look good, and they may, to a degree, enable the
rulers of the state possessing them to posture on the international stage,
but in the final analysis they will not achieve their purpose: the protec-
tion of the rights of the citizens of the country in whose laws they feature.
This is not to say that the enactment of laws, or constitutional provisions,
which aim to achieve this purpose should not be encouraged but that
without more they cannot be expected to prove effective in all circum-
stances. In times of crisis politics tend to override both constitutions and
national legal protections.
Is there any guide from international human rights law? The Pream-
ble to the Charter of the United Nations, in its statement of that organi-
zation's aims, ranks respects for human rights second only to the need to
save later generations from the scourge of war. On joining the United Na-
tions, member states "pledge themselves to take joint and separate ac-
tion" for the achievement of the United Nations' goal of the promotion of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms "for all without dis-
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tinction as to race, sex, language or religion."83
In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 4 Today the rights it enunciates, encompassing civil, polit-
ical, economic, social and cultural rights, are, for the most part, encapsu-
lated in and made legally binding on the states parties to them, including
Sri Lanka, by the two major international covenants on human rights: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights88 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.86 Undeniably,
despite the considerable number of ratifications of these and other impor-
tant international human rights instruments, the human rights record of
some of the signatory states leaves much to be desired. Nonetheless, de-
spite limitations to the effectiveness of international human rights instru-
ments, their finalization and adoption is a significant step forward in that
they provide an agreed, if not always observed, measure which govern-
ments have accepted as the standards of human rights they are required
to afford to those within their jurisdictions. No longer can ratifying gov-
ernments claim with any legitimacy that breaches of these obligations to-
wards people resident within their territory is a matter of domestic juris-
diction only, and not a matter of proper concern to the wider
international community. By their signatures, any breaches of these in-
struments become breaches of those governments' binding obligations
under international law.
In addition to these developments at the gobal level, there have been
regional initiatives. First European states, and then the states of Latin
America developed human rights instruments. s7 Both regions have estab-
lished regional commissions and courts of human rights. Recently the Or-
ganization of African Unity developed a regional charter of human rights
and, in 1987, established a commission of human rights.8 The Arab re-
gion, which has a commission on human rights, has now produced a draft
regional charter of human rights.
The regional settlement of disputes threatening international peace
and security is envisaged in Articles 33 and 52 of the United Nations
83. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
84. Univesal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 217A (I1), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948), reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 10.1
(1985).
85. Supra note 15.
86. Supra note 12.
87. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; and American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS, OR, OEA/Ser.A/16, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970) and the American Convention on Human Rights, OAS, OR, OEA/SER.L/
V/E.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 2 (1948).
88. See African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), adopted June
27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67iRev.5, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 59 (1981). In late 1987, the African Commission on Human Rights, created by the
African Charter, began to function.
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Charter and can, quite legitimately, be extended to disputes concerning
human rights violations. In fact Article 44 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights expressly recognizes this. 9 There are some
legitimate concerns, however, concerning the form which regional human
rights instruments might take. The whole concept of universal human
rights can be threatened if regional instruments stray from the basic
norms of the international instruments and, as a consequence, produce
one set of human rights for Africa, a different set in the Americas, yet
another in Europe and so on. The United Nations has from time to time
expressed reservations to regional arrangements on this score, and care
does need to be exercised to ensure that the rights in the universal instru-
ments are strictly maintained in all regional documents.
Despite these cautions, when it comes to implementation there is
much to be said for the establishment of regional systems. Many states
which have recently shaken off the yoke of colonialism are not happy at
conceding part of their new found independence to any external system,
particularly to one located in a remote area of the world, and more partic-
ularly if that is the geographical location of their former colonial rulers.
Further, the same system of implementation will not necessarily be ap-
propriate in different parts of the world given, to take just one example,
the widely differing geographical considerations of size and distance oper-
ating, for instance in Europe as compared to the Pacific. Also, regional
mechanisms have an advantage over the global in that the nations co-
operating within a regional framework are likely to have certain common-
alities eg of culture, language, law and political and economic institutions
and, in such a context, measures adopted for the promotion and imple-
mentation of human rights standards are likely to be more realistic and
practicable than are their United Nations counterparts.
Certainly the European and Inter-American systems have developed
much more effective implementation procedures than has been possible
at the global level. It is too early yet to know how effective the African
Commission will be. The Inter-American system was founded and oper-
ates in a region which has seen severe breaches of human rights not un-
like those just catalogued in the case of Sri Lanka, yet through its estab-
lishment of an individual petition system, its scrutiny even of states in its
region which have not ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, its reporting on country situation, its sending of on-site missions
and its constant emphasis on the need for democratic systems of govern-
ment and the observance of the rule of law, has done a great deal to en-
courage a return of democracy to states within that region in recent
years. 90
89. Supra note 15.
90. For a good account of the system, see R.E. Norris, The Individual Petition Proce-
dure of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in GUIDE TO IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 108-132 (H. Hannum ed., 1984).
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Notably absent from concrete regional arrangements are the Asian
and Pacific states. During the last decade, a regional body, the Law Asso-
ciation for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA), has taken steps aimed at
encouraging wide-ranging discussion of possible regional and sub-regional
arrangements for this area, and in the next section of the paper the steps
so far taken by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee are briefly
outlined.
A. Steps Taken by the Lawasia Human Rights Committee
The LAWASIA Human Rights Committee has had a continuing in-
terest in the establishment of human rights mechanisms in the region
since it came into being at the Sixth LAWASIA Conference held (ironi-
cally it now seems) in Colombo in 1979. From the outset one of the Com-
mittee's terms of reference has been to initiate steps towards the ultimate
establishment of an Asian Commission and/or Court of Human Rights.
Unlike Europe, Africa and the Americas, the Asia Pacific region has
no existing inter-governmental structure with which a regional human
rights commission could be associated. For this and other reasons the
Committee has seen the establishment of such a commission as a long-
term project, and has felt it desirable to approach the task in stages. The
Committee therefore has sought to promote the protection of human
rights in the region in several different ways: first, through its dissemina-
tion of information concerning human rights issues; second, through its
services in setting in motion the meetings which established a regional
coalition of non-governmental human rights organizations; and third,
through the taking of specific steps which it is hoped ultimately will lead
to the establishment of sub-regional (and eventually of a regional)
commission.
1. Dissemination
In furtherance of this goal, the Committee, like may other human
rights NGO's, has produced and distributed various publications. It has
commissioned the translation of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights into sev-
eral important Asian languages, including Thai, Filipino, Hindi, Malay
and Burmese. The Committee has produced and published several re-
ports covering human rights issues of importance in the region, e.g. re-
ports on militarization in the Pacific,' on the status of women,92 on issues
concerning indigenous populations," on the situation in Burma,94 and in
91. LAWASIA Human Rights Newsletter, September 1986.
92. LAWASIA, Women and the Law (Lahore, 1987).
93. LAWASIA, Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Sydney, 1987).
94. M. Szteinvok, Burma (LAWASIA, Sydney, 1988).
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March 1991 on the situation in Tibet.95 In addition, it has convened a
number of conferences on matters of regional human rights concern, e.g.
on the status of women, on the independence of the judiciary and of the
legal profession, and on the exploitation of children. Since governments
in Asia and the Pacific have a poor record in terms of the numbers of
accessions to and ratifications of international human rights instruments
the committee has actively urged them to ratify the major international
human rights instruments. The Committee sends observer missions to
contentious human rights trials and to situations raising serious human
rights issues and publishes reports of these missions, e.g. to Pakistan,96
Sri Lanka, 97 mainland Malaysia,98 and Sarawak.9
2. The Establishment of a Regional Coalition of Human Rights
NGO's
An initiative which the LAWASIA Human Rights standing Commit-
tee took in its early years was to play the role of catalyst in the formation
of a regional coalition of non-governmental human rights organizations.
The lack of inter-governmental structures to protect human rights in the
Asia Pacific region has meant that the activities of non-governmental or-
ganizations have assumed greater significance in the protection and pro-
motion of human rights than might otherwise have been the case. Co-
operation and contact between active non-governmental human rights or-
ganizations has the potential to fulfil a variety of useful purposes: to en-
able more effective pursuit of common goals, to provide contact, informa-
tion and support, the opportunity to avoid duplication of effort and also
to provide assistance in the protection of members who are, from time to
time subject to harassment simply by virtue of their activities.
Accordingly, the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee in the early
1980's organized and addressed a series of meetings of groups of non-gov-
ernmental human rights bodies to explore the kinds of co-operation
which might be useful. The NGO's attending the first meeting held in
Bangkok in 1981 were very much in favor of establishing some loose form
of organization, and the Committee undertook to perform a co-ordination
role. Subsequently, NGO meetings were held in Colombo in June 1982, in
New Delhi in October 1982 and in Manila in September 1983. At the 1983
meeting, attended by 27 organizations from 12 countries, the Asian Coali-
tion of Human Rights Organizations (ACHRO) was formed. This body, as
established in Manila, is separate from and independent of LAWASIA,
and since that time has pursued its own vigorous program of activities.
95. LAWASIA-TIN Report, DEFYING THE DRAGON (1991).
96. See generally R. NICHOLSON, REPORT TO THE LAWASIA COUNCIL ON THE INDEPEN-
DENCE AND FREEDOM OF LAWYERS IN PAKISTAN (1982).
97. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1.
98. See generally D. MALCOLM, THE TRIAL OF PARAM CUMARASWAMY (1986).
99. See generally D. BONIFACE, CASES AGAINST PENAN TRIBAL MEMBERS IN SARAWAK
(1988).
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3. Moves Towards the Establishment of Regional and Sub-regional
Human Rights Commissions
At the Sixth LAWASIA Conference, Mr. P.J. Downey of New Zea-
land, later to become the Co-Chairman, with Mr. F.S. Nariman of India,
of the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee, presented a paper advocat-
ing the creation of a Human Rights Commission for the South Pacific
region, urging that such a move would be a viable step towards the even-
tual establishment of a Commission of Human Rights for the entire Asia-
Pacific region.
Shortly afterwards, Dr. D.H. Geddes, then Secretary General for
LAWASIA, prepared a background paper'00 for the U.N. convened Semi-
nar on National, Local and Regional Arrangements for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region held in Colombo in
June 1982. In this paper Dr. Geddes canvassed the desirability and diffi-
culties of setting up a regional human rights commission. He looked at
the history of the establishment of the European, African, American and
Arab Commissions, and pointed out that, with these as examples, it
should be possible, allowing for the differences appropriate to the context
of this region, to set up such a body here. He concluded, however, that
since there was no inter-governmental structure for the region as a whole,
it would be wise to approach the task in stages, with the establishment of
a regional Human Rights Commission being the ultimate goal. Indeed,
the U.N. Colombo Seminar did not resolve to establish such a Commis-
sion, seeing it as a very long term project indeed.
Dr. Geddes recommended, among other approaches, the creation of
sub-regional commissions as a preliminary step to the setting up of an
overall regional human rights commission. For this purpose he divided
the area into four sub-regions: the Western Region (Iran, Afghanistan,
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); the Central, expanded
ASEAN region (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore Indonesia, Philippines); the South and Western Region (Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Pacific Island com-
munities); and the North and North-Eastern Region (China, Hong Kong,
North Korea, South Korea and Japan).
In many ways the Pacific region would be the one easiest to tackle
first for the reasons outlined in Mr. P.J. Downey's paper presented to the
Sixth LAWASIA Conference: cultural affinity, a good degree of political
understanding, a certain historical involvement, relationships of trade
and through the continual movements of people in and around the region.
There is generally good human rights record in this part of the world,
something seen as a promising sign in that it indicates a climate favorable
to, and respectful of, human rights. In addition there are existing struc-
tural groupings, such as the South Pacific Commission and judicial con-
100. This paper is reproduced in LAWASIA, Recent Trends in Human Rights (1982).
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ferences are held regularly. Such structures could well provide a base of
co-operation from which to begin to build.
In April 1985, the LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee
convened a Seminar in Fiji to consider prospects for the establishment of
a Pacific Human Rights Commission.' The sixty-three participants were
all people keenly interested in human rights. Delegates attended from
Australia, Belau, Cook Islands, Eastern Caroline Islands, Fiji, France,
French Polynesia, Hawaii, Korea, Malaysia Philippines, Nauru, New Cal-
edonia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Western Samoa.
They included lawyers, non-governmental representatives, social workers,
judges, church workers, academics and representatives of minority (in-
cluding indigenous) groups.
Included amongst the speakers were a Senior Lawyer with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Provisional Government of Kanaky; the Vice President of the World
Council of Indigenous People; an anti-nuclear lawyer from the Republic
of Belau; the Chairman of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission
and the Deputy Chairman of the Australian Human Rights Commission.
The conference was opened by the Fijian Minister of Justice and Attor-
ney-General. Government observers from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Guam, Western Samoa, Kiribati, India
and Malaysia were also in attendance.
Among the topics discussed at the conference were: decolonization
movements in New Caledonia and French Polynesia; nuclear issues affect-
ing the Pacific; the position of women; and the rights of indigenous popu-
lations and issues of development. It was the first time people from, or
interested in, the Pacific area had agreed to come together to discuss
many of these issues in such a way. A report of the proceedings of the
Conference and an edited collection of all its papers was prepared and
distributed to heads of government in the region. At the same time gov-
ernments were again urged to ratify the major human rights conventions,
invited to promote greater awareness of human rights among their people
and encouraged to give consideration to the early establishment of an in-
ter-governmental treaty-based human rights body.
In its Recommendation No. 10102 thc meeting had urged the LAWA-
SIA Human Rights Committee to conduct a research project to investi-
gate whether or not a human rights commission for the area might be
feasible. In accordance with this recommendation the Committee estab-
lished first a Drafting Committee and later a Working Party whose mem-
bers all possessed considerable experience and expertise within the Pa-
cific area. A meeting of the Drafting Committee, held in Sydney in late
June 1986, resulted in a brain-storming session which proved fruitful and
101. See Report on The Conference on Prospects for the Establishment of an Inter-
governmental Human Rights Commission in the South Pacific Held in Fiji (1985).
102. Id. at 510.
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worthwhile. Draft proposals were then drawn up. A Working Party was
constituted which met in Apia in August 1986, and the draft which had
emerged from the Sydney meeting was taken further. The Law Ministers,
who were in Western Samoa for the South Pacific Law Conference being
held at the same time, were told of the project and expressed interest in
it. After this meeting the members of the Working Party remained in
contact and continued to work together.
In May 1987 a regional UNESCO Conference was held at the Univer-
sity of New South Wales Human Rights Centre in Sydney, Australia,
called Human Rights Teaching, Information and Dissemination.10 3 In
Session 13, What is to be Done: The Need for a Regional Impetus, the
LAWASIA initiative towards a Human Rights Commission for the Pacific
area was the subject of discussion. The Papua New Guinean representa-
tive on the LAWASIA Working Party, also a LAWASIA Human Rights
Committee member, was the paper-writer for this session.
The UNESCO Seminar participants, in commenting on the paper,
noted that discussion by Pacific participants throughout the seminar had
reflected a concern about the adoption of human rights instruments form
outside the region. The point was made that often what is important is
not how human rights are phrased in charters, but how they are inter-
preted and applied. At the present time, the European application of the
European Convention constitutes a large proportion of the available juris-
prudence. Through a regional charter and commission the Pacific region
would be able to develop its own distinct jurisprudence. This would assist
in avoiding "Eurocentric" interpretations of human rights. The partici-
pants saw immense benefit flowing from this to the whole international
human rights movements. They expressed support for the project and
urged LAWASIA to continue it, suggesting that perhaps UNESCO might
also become involved.
Turning to a larger forum, in August 1988, the LAWASIA Human
Rights Committee organized a seminar'0 4 which was held in Manila. A
delegate from the Geneva based U.N. Center for Human Rights joined
the thirty-seven delegates from twelve countries who attended the semi-
nar. The program addressed human rights and the role of international,
regional and national governmental commissions, the protection of
human rights in national constitutions, education and issues of
implementation.
Returning more specifically to its promotion of a Pacific Human
Rights mechanism, the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee in May
1989 convened a seminar in Apia, Western Samoa."0 5 The Drafting Com-
103. See UNESCO, Report of Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar Human Rights Teaching,
Information and Dissemination (1987).
104. See LAWASIA, Conference Report, Human Rights Today and Tomorrow: Na-
tional Human Rights Commission and Other Organs (1989).
105. See LAWASIA, Report of Seminar on Draft Pacific Charter of Human Rights
held in Western Samoa (1989).
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mittee produced a report raising the issues to be considered in relation to
the establishment of a regional human rights body and had also devel-
oped a Draft Charter which had taken as its model the African Charter of
Human and People's Rights." 6 The Draft Pacific Charter sets down civil,
political, economic, social, cultural and people's rights, and refers also to
the duties of governments and the duties of individuals. It contains a pro-
vision for a Pacific Human Rights Commission to be established not only
to supervise compliance, ' but also to assist governments with activities
related to human rights issues generally. '08 It is envisaged that this would
involve assisting governments in meeting their reporting and other obliga-
tions incurred under regional and international human rights treaties,0 9
obligations which can impose very considerable strains on small states
with limited resources.
The applicable principles by which the Commission is to be guided
include the major international human rights instruments and also Pa-
cific traditions. The Commission is required to draw inspiration from in-
ternational law on human rights and also to take into consideration as
subsidiary measures "other general or special international conventions,
laying down rules expressly recognized by Parties to the present Charter;
Pacific practices consistent with international norms on human and peo-
ples' rights; customs generally accepted as law; general principles of law
recognized by Pacific states; as well as legal precedents and doctrine." 110
Article 61A provides:
The Parties recognize the customs and traditions of the diverse
communities of this region. The rights, freedoms and duties recog-
nized in this Charter shall be interpreted and understood by the Par-
ties and the Commission in the light of these customs and traditions.
This draft of the Working Party was the subject of discussion at the
Apia Seminar and, as a consequence, further amendments were made.
LAWASIA has now forwarded copies of this latest version of the Draft
Pacific Charter and its Explanatory Memoranda to all governments in the
Pacific region, requesting comments and suggestions."' It is hoped that
the next activity will involve Pacific government representatives in active
discussion about the proposed charter, about a possible commission, and
the whole issue of the protection and promotion of human rights.
106. The Draft Charter and explanatory memoranda are reproduced at the end of the
1989 LAWASIA WESTERN SAMOA SEMINAR REPORT.




111. Copies of the Draft Pacific Charter and its Explanatory Memoranda may be ob-
tained from the new Secretariat to the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee. In October
1990 the Secretariat moved form its earlier location in the Faculty of Law at the University
of New South Wales in Sydney to its present location in the Faculty of Law at the Univer-
sity of Atenio in Manila.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The recent severe breaches of human rights, the escalation of vio-
lence, and the erosion of democracy and of the rule of law in Sri Lanka
exemplify the point that domestic protection of basic rights, without
more, may not always be able to withstand internal political pressures,
and that the protection of human rights at an international level is essen-
tial. This realization led to the emphasis in the U.N. Charter on the pro-
tection of fundamental rights and freedoms for all without discrimina-
tion, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the many
other human rights instruments which have now been drafted and
adopted at the international level. Despite this growth of international
human rights instruments, the development of effective universal enforce-
ment mechanisms, which achieve both acceptability to large numbers of
governments and also offer effective protection of fundamental rights, is
taking time, persistent effort and a great deal of patience. To date, re-
gional implementation systems, specifically the European and the Inter-
American systems, have offered a far more effective protection of human
rights than has ben achieved at the global level.
Although the aim, ultimately, must be for effective universal imple-
mentation arrangements, current experience would suggest that in the
short term, and as a step along the way, it may be beneficial to establish
such arrangements first at regional and sub-regional levels. Accordingly,
these moves by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee are put forward
for consideration as one possible approach through which we may seek to
further the promotion of human rights and thus the protection of the
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family which, as acknowledged in the Preamble to the Universal
Declaration, are essential prerequisites for a true and firm foundation for
freedom, justice and peace in the world.
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